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 Much of  the modern perception of  the role of  economic production in human 
life - whether on the Left or on the Right of  the political spectrum – views it as an inferior, 
instrumental activity oriented toward self-preservation, self-interest, or profit, and thus as 
essentially distinct from the truly human action concerned with moral values, justice, and 
various forms of  self-fulfillment. This widely shared worldview is rooted, on the one hand, 
in the Aristotelian tradition that sees labor as a badge of  slavery, and freedom as lying in 
the domain of  politics and pure (not technical) knowledge, and, on the other hand, in the 
aristocratic mediaeval Christian outlook, which – partly under Aristotle’s influence – sees 
nature as always already adapted (by divine design) to serving human bodily needs, and the 
purpose of  life as directed toward higher, spiritual reality. Marx, although he attacked the 
Aristotelian distinction between “action” and “production,” also envisaged the undistorted 
production process in essentially collectivist Aristotelian terms. 
 As against this, liberal thinkers,  above all Locke, have developed an elaborate 
alternative to the Aristotelian worldview, reinterpreting the production process as a moral 
activity par excellence consisting in a gradual transformation of  the alien nature into a genuinely 
human environment reflecting human design and providing the basis of  human autonomy. 
Adam Smith completed Locke’s thought by explaining how production is essentially a form 
of  cooperation among free individuals whose self-interested labor serves the best interest 
of  all. The greatest “culture war” in history is to re-establish the moral significance of  
economic activity in the consciousness of  modern political and cultural elites.
 Author notes: The author would like to thank The Gary S. Davis Faculty Research 
Fund for generous assistance during the preparation of  this article.
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The relationship between economic activity and moral values has always been problematic, 
and remains so to this day. Just “tune in” to the standard language of  Western social protest 
– it is not merely an eccentric idiom of  a marginal social group, but an expression of  a set 
of  beliefs that resonate among a broad spectrum of  the general public, including a good 
portion of  the educated public.
 The first thing that strikes many as deeply unattractive about much economic activity 
is that the motivating force of  its practitioners is self-interest. Right there, economics and 
morality part ways: morality, it is often said, is about other-regarding behavior, while self-
interest is at best what we share with all kinds of  lower creatures, and at worst a form of  
straightforward moral insensitivity – egoism, selfishness, a preference for one’s own self  – 
as opposed to following the most basic moral norm of  treating others as true equals who 
deserve the same consideration as ourselves.
 Not only is self-interest the basis of  economic activity, the measure of  its success is 
profit, an excess of  money left after one’s own costs (including labor) have been fully covered. 
Profits, especially from “speculation” – buying low, selling high – are often seen as essentially 
a form of  exploitation of  other people based on their greater need, perhaps due to lesser 
wealth or education, a stroke of  bad luck, or simple deprivation – again, the opposite of  
what we associate with moral behavior.
 At the basis of  the drive for profit is what passes as “love of  money” – auri sacra 
fames – a form of  moral hypostasis that takes what is properly a merely convenient means of  
exchange, with no intrinsic value of  its own, for something worth pursuing for its own sake; 
in other words, what many see as a moral confusion born of  an inability to discern things 
that are genuinely meaningful and a devotion to vain trivialities.
 To be sure, we all need to eat, and many things produced by a well-functioning 
economy are very useful, so it can’t really be denied that there is, after all, a certain merit 
in economic activity. Provided, that is, that several conditions are satisfied: (1) Economic 
activity is not left to its own devices – for then it is said to degenerate into excess – but is 
channeled and regulated by individuals and institutions that make sure businesses (and the 
people involved in them) do not forget their social responsibilities. (2) Inequality, which is 
seen as the inevitable result of  economic activity, is tempered and countered by a system of  
redistribution. Finally, (3), a wide civic space independent of  economic activity is available 
and protected – politics, churches, educational institutions, etc. – in which citizens are more 
properly seen as realizing their true calling, beyond the narrow-minded materialistic pursuits 
that dominate the mindset shaped and determined by economic concerns.
 The separation of  economic activity from the moral sphere of  human action and 
the moral depreciation of  the driving force behind economic growth are, of  course, not 
an unambiguous phenomenon in Western culture. After all, in the wake of  the Industrial 
Revolution, economic production has so radically transformed the shape of  the Western 
world, and resulted in such unprecedented wealth of  modern societies, that economic 
production cannot be viewed as completely unworthy. Also, various countries and cultures, 
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even within the Western world, differ in the extent and degree to which they share the moral 
skepticism in the evaluation of  the worth of  economic activity – and the skepticism itself  
is perhaps slightly more common in some European countries than in America.1 But one 
cannot understand much of  the standard language of  contemporary social analysis without 
realizing that the tension between economic activity, on the one hand, and moral concerns (as 
well as the models of  life thought to be truly worth living), on the other, is deeply ingrained 
in Western culture and constitutes an important component of  social consciousness in the 
developed world.
 The gap between economics and morality is deeply rooted in the pre-modern (and 
pre-industrial) cultural tradition, and, like much in the Western intellectual history, goes back 
to Greece and to Aristotle – the man who articulated the meaning of  the Greek heritage and 
imprinted it on the Christian world.
 The crucial insight of  Aristotle was to locate the economic sphere of  “production” 
(poiesis), together with sexual reproduction, in the domain of  human unfreedom, defined by 
the necessity of  assuring our physical survival through the satisfaction of  our needs – the 
brute facts of  our bodily existence over which we have essentially no choice. Unlike free 
action (praxis), which embodies the uniquely human ability to do things “for their own sake,” 
i.e., merely because we choose to pursue them as something that is “good in itself,” poiesis is 
instrumental to the achievement of  an essentially external, unchosen objective. 
 Associated with praxis and poiesis are also separate types of  human skills and abilities. 
Praxis is guided by knowledge (episteme), the uniquely human achievement embodying the very 
essence of  the human species, i.e., the rationality that provides the differentia specifica which 
sets us apart from other animals. True knowledge is a disinterested inquiry, also worthy of  
acquisition for its own sake, not geared toward the achievement of  any other good, and 
precisely because of  this inherent worth, the pursuit of  episteme and the actions dictated by 
it have inherent moral worth and constitute the quintessential element of  virtue (areté) in 
human life.
 As opposed to episteme, production is guided by techne, not the real knowledge 
worthy of  acquisition for the sake of  realizing our essential rationality, but a mere skill or 
craftsmanship, directed toward the satisfaction of  the needs and wants imposed on us by 
our animal nature – the fact that we have bodies which require sustenance, shelter, and other 
comforts we cannot help but desire. 
 Finally, action and production are literally divided by the spaces in which they are 
located. Praxis is a public activity, something we do together with other human beings who 
are our equals – equals, above all, in their being free and able to pursue the truly human ends 
of  virtue and rationality – and with whom we realize together our nature as social beings, 
creatures who complement and fulfill each other through mutual recognition and forms of  
1  The emotional aura around the word “speculation” is a good example. In America, it is normal to say, in a purely descriptive sense, 
that someone got rich by “speculating” on, say, the stock exchange, and there is even a vague sense of  admiration for a talent of  
some sort implied in this expression. By contrast, in Germany, for example, or in the Slavic parts of  Europe, to refer to someone as a 
“speculator” (Spekulant) is to use an unambiguously pejorative term and to classify the person as morally defective.
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truly human interaction. In other words, praxis takes place in the civic and political space 
(agora) in which we build our knowledge and character, discuss the ends worth pursuing, 
make common decisions, worship true gods, and strive to accomplish the great deeds that 
can assure us a form of  immortality and advance the progress of  human civilization. But to 
be a citizen, according to Aristotle, a person must already be free, i.e. one whose needs are 
already satisfied, so he can devote his energy and attention to those things that are not the 
necessities imposed on us by our nature, but which can be pursued for their own sake and 
with no other purpose in mind. Freedom, for Aristotle, means freedom from necessity, and thus a 
citizen is someone who has the leisure needed to devote his life to the higher ends that allow 
the fulfillment of  man’s true vocation.
 The satisfaction of  those necessities, on the other hand, i.e. the process of  production, 
is not something that constitutes a part of  public, political life. On the contrary, production is 
a mere precondition of  citizenship and, much as sexual intercourse, which is a precondition 
of  the reproduction of  the species, it is entirely excluded from the public domain, and takes 
place in the privacy of  a household – oikos, from which derives our term for “economics.”2 
Economic decisions are thus also not at all something that the state is supposed to be 
involved with; they are an entirely private matter of  the master of  the household, whose 
freedom is sustained by production, and most of  the productive process is carried out by 
people who are themselves not free. Indeed, the very labor, i.e. the physical and mental effort 
involved in the production of  goods and services necessary to satisfy human needs (and 
enable some men to devote their energies to free action), is the quintessence of  unfreedom 
that immediately identifies those who perform it as slaves.3
 While few people today would articulate their views in exactly the Aristotelian terms, 
the impact and persistence of  the general Aristotelian outlook on matters economic cannot 
be possibly underestimated. To be sure, Aristotle’s insights became somewhat modified when 
they merged with the Christian and aristocratic worldviews of  medieval and early modern 
Europe, but his thought largely defined those later beliefs and provided their deepest and 
longest-lasting philosophical underpinnings, while the Christian and aristocratic worlds 
provided in turn an incredibly powerful vehicle for carrying the Aristotelian mindset all the 
way to our times. Indeed, the Christian-aristocratic system of  values has shaped much of  the 
European civilization up to the present day, and some of  it is easily recognizable in a good deal of  
contemporary thinking about the relationship between economics and the morally good life. 
 It is important not to lose sight of  the amazing persistence of  the Aristotelian heritage 
in our own view of  the moral paucity of  economic activity. To begin with, while it is not 
hard to see how the worldview of  European aristocracy had been shaped by the Aristotelian 
2  Strictly speaking, the word refers to household (oikos) management (nomos).
3  Aristotle devoted some attention to the issue of  justice involved in enslaving people, defending it on the basis that not all people 
are capable of  engaging in, or even understanding the nature of, free action, whether it be the pursuit of  knowledge or the virtue of  
doing other things that are worth doing for their own sake.  But the precise form of  legal enslavement is of  secondary importance here. 
What has had lasting significance, much beyond the legal existence of  slavery, is the identification of  labor, defined as the activity of  
production of  goods and services for the satisfaction of  human needs, as an essentially inferior form of  life, incompatible with the 
realization of  the moral calling of  man.
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outlook, we may be tempted to underestimate the degree to which the aristocratic heritage 
continues to shape the value system of  most Western, though perhaps especially European, 
societies. A general contempt for things “bourgeois” (as opposed to “noble”) is only the 
most general expression of  this heritage. Its more concrete forms are the idea that the 
(bourgeois) pursuit of  money (even if  the economists may see it as capital accumulation) is 
in fact “vulgar” and the idea that the “vocation” of  man consists in the pursuit of  knowledge 
and beauty, as well as a life of  “service” devoted to politics and social benevolence. These 
rather straightforward translations of  a model of  life “worthy of  a gentleman” remain very 
deeply ingrained in our own culture.
 Perhaps more interestingly, much of  the outlook of  the modern Left reveals a 
striking affinity with the aristocratic system of  values underpinning the more conservative 
critiques of  the “bourgeois-capitalist” system. Moreover, this affinity is not just a product 
of  the fact that the economic and social system brought about by the “bourgeoisie” is the 
common enemy of  the aristocratic worldview it replaced and of  the revolutionary vanguard 
eager to build a new order on its grave. Indeed, perhaps the deepest “ideological” insight 
of  the modern Left is that the emancipation of  the oppressed working classes does not 
result from simply increasing their material comfort, but requires a wholesale infusion of  
a genuine “moral dimension” into the lives of  the people enslaved by the mindlessness of  
labor characteristic of  the modern economy.
 The background against which the modern intellectual Left sees the nature of  
economic activity is perhaps best expressed by the two towering figures of  Rousseau 
and Marx, both of  whom begin by explaining how, in the absence of  fundamental and 
thoroughgoing change, the process of  economic production is, at its very core, destructive 
of  human freedom; indeed, of  the very essence of  humanity itself.
 Rousseau’s analysis of  the morally degraded character of  economic activity is, in 
one important way, even more damning than Aristotle’s. For where Aristotle found labor 
enslaving because it epitomizes what is not done freely, but out of  necessity constituted by 
the brute fact that our bodily existence requires the satisfaction of  a variety of  needs over 
which we have no control, Rousseau believed that human needs are by nature modest and 
that even a primitive “savage” could lead an essentially happy life while having to satisfy 
them. But what is distinctive of  the modern society, characterized by the tremendous 
growth of  man’s productive capacities, already visible even the early stages of  the Industrial 
Revolution, is the fact that the very purpose served by this huge development is the most 
deeply unnecessary hypertrophy of  wants created by a perversion of  human rationality. For 
ironically, it is precisely our rationality, understood as the capacity to rise above our immediate 
immersion in the world around us and reflect on our place in it, that destroys our natural 
peace and tranquility, and thrusts us into a world of  insecurity, inequality, and alienation. 
In other words, modern economy is no better at satisfying human needs and desires than a 
most primitive hunter-gatherer society because it is a by-product of  a tremendous growth of  
human needs – a self-feeding monster arisen out of  vanity, envy of  what others possess, a 
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selfish desire to be better than other people, and the perverted institution of  private property 
that allows humans to take things out of  their natural order and transform them into tools 
of  unlimited ambition and egotistic self-aggrandizement. 
 The only answer to this moral degradation, according to Rousseau, is nearly perfectly 
Aristotelian: to curtail the individualistic turn of  the modern society, focused around private 
property, selfishness, and estrangement from both nature and the human community, in favor 
of  a truly moral life of  communal decision making and the realization of  perfect freedom 
through political participation. Like the Aristotelian agora, the Rousseauean state saves the 
individual by freeing him from the tyranny of  artificial needs, putting him in a position 
of  fundamental equality with his co-citizens, and establishing a fraternity that replaces the 
natural order of  things with the quintessentially human order of  virtue and moral autonomy.
 Marx’s indictment of  the enslaving and dehumanizing nature of  labor under the 
conditions of  the capitalist market economy, and his remedy for it, are also, at least in 
part, made of  the same cloth as Rousseau’s, and ultimately Aristotle’s, critique. But in one 
fundamental way, Marx is modern thinker who breaks with Aristotle’s inherent separation 
between the domains of  free action and unfree economic production. Indeed, quite to 
the contrary, the essence of  the Marxian insight is the identification of  the two:  Marx’s 
equivalent of  Aristotle’s Politics is his economic opus magnum, Das Kapital, with its implicit 
claim that properly understood economic science explains the liberating dynamic through 
which labor ultimately produces a social and political order in which human beings can 
realize their own freedom. And that freedom is not realized “on the back,” so to speak, of  
the satisfaction of  material needs, but through a socialized process of  production that not 
only assures such unheard of  wealth as to eliminate the very notion of  scarcity (and hence 
the Aristotelian “necessity”), but also provides a vehicle through which humans express their 
own creativity and produce a world that is truly theirs. In other words, building on a richer 
than Aristotle’s concept of  labor (which he came to by bringing together Ricardo’s labor 
theory of  value with the concept of  labor in Hegel’s famous “master-slave dialectic”), Marx 
insists on the ultimate identity of  praxis and poiesis, to be realized in a completely harmonious 
communist society.
 Still, it is only the ultimate socialization of  the productive process, and the replacement 
of  a market ordering of  individual actions with the collective decisions of  the state that 
will bring, according to Marx, the liberation of  labor and of  the laboring man himself. Up 
to that point, Marx, in his critique of  the capitalist society, follows the aristocratic tastes 
of  his Aristotelian predecessors. The creative power of  labor may be, for Marx, the true 
differentia specifica of  the human kind, but under the economic conditions dominated by 
private property and by private decisions driven by profits, labor – and hence human nature 
itself  – is transformed into a commodity, i.e., a thing, the market value of  which, like that of  all 
other things, is measured by the amount of  labor that it takes to “produce” it by keeping the 
human machine alive. Indeed, under the capitalist conditions, not only is labor itself  valued 
in terms of  its mere subsistence, but its product – the objective reflection of  our humanity -- 
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also becomes devoid of  its spiritual, indeed moral, meaning, and acquires a purely economic 
significance: that of  a mere market value. In a highly theorized recapitulation of  Rousseau’s 
fall of  man, the Marxian world dominated by private property and the market system rests 
on an elaborate system of  enslaved labor, with millions of  dehumanized machines producing 
an unheard of  monetary wealth of  goods devoid of  any genuine value. To restore that value, 
laborers must be freed, and this can only be achieved in a political community of  equals, 
deciding together how to use their combined material and intellectual resources and order 
their own lives in a way that is not imposed by the material conditions of  their existence. In 
a rather far-fetched circle, the Aristotelian gentleman-citizen is reborn in a workers’ paradise.
 The move that distinguishes Marx from the long-standing tradition of  placing 
economic activity in the purely instrumental domain of  human life, i.e. his deep identification 
of  praxis and poiesis, is not his own invention; indeed, it is the crucial insight of  the English 
liberal tradition, deriving from Locke and Smith, which, together with the Hegelian heritage, 
shaped Marx’s intellectual formation. The person responsible for the most fundamental 
re-orientation of  European thinking about the place of  production in the constitution of  
human liberty – in fact of  the very concept of  labor that Aristotle had seen as the essence of  
slavery – is John Locke. Arguing quite consciously against the Aristotelian tradition, Locke 
claims that labor is the most fundamental attribute of  humanity because it is the activity that 
enables human beings to transform the alien natural world around them into a “tamed,” 
“human” environment, reflecting our own design, serving our needs, and capable of  freeing 
us from the shackles of  the mechanical laws of  nature.4  
The starting point of  Locke’s philosophy – the understanding of  the concept of  
necessity, in contradistinction to which human freedom is to be defined – is distinctly modern, 
and thus also quite distinct from, and built in conscious opposition to, the Aristotelian 
model. For Aristotle, nature was defined in terms of  a hierarchy of  purposes (teloi) embodied 
in the essences of  all things, each essence representing a “perfection” toward which things 
of  the given kind are said to “strive” and which is the driving force of  their behavior. In 
this worldview, therefore, man had a natural place in the order of  the universe – the feature 
of  Aristotelian natural science that fitted very well with the Christian outlook, in which the 
world was created according to a “plan” or “design” that placed humans at the apex of  a 
pyramid of  the ends of  all things. 
Although Locke was a devout Christian, he was also a thoroughly modern man, and 
“nature” is for him a term defined by the mechanistic science of  the 17th century: a system 
governed not by a pre-determined set of  ends, but by the iron laws that make the state of  
the world at each point in time fully determined by the efficient causes located in the past. 
Moreover, in Locke’s view, the laws governing the natural world are entirely indifferent to 
the ends of  human life, and no pre-established harmony can be assumed between our own 
needs or life plans and the contingent form of  the world around us. So the fundamental 
condition of  human life is that we are thrown into an essentially alien environment – not 
4 For a more detailed and systematic exposition of  some of  the arguments made here, see my Nature and Politics; Liberalism in the 
Philosophies of  Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Cornell University Press, 1987).
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necessarily (or maybe not even) hostile, but also not one that is “naturally” suited to serve 
us. Quite to the contrary, to the extent that we are a part of  the natural world – i.e. bodies 
among bodies – we are also subject to the mechanical impact of  the reality outside of  us, 
and potentially shaped by it to the detriment of  our own interests and designs. Necessity, 
for Locke, unlike for Aristotle, is not just something we do not entirely choose ourselves; 
it is something that we do not “pursue” at all -- a mechanical outcome of  other forces that 
determine what we do, much as a falling rock is not pursuing some goal that it did not 
choose, but is simply determined by past (external) events to move along a path over which 
it does not have the slightest control.
Locke’s concept of  freedom is also thoroughly modern: it identifies freedom with 
an element of  contingency that our actions can introduce into the deterministic order of  
the universe when we act because we conceive of  something and then realize our design 
by injecting our will into the natural order of  the world around us. While the process of  
perception and knowledge acquisition may have a largely mechanistic explanation – the 
outside world “impresses” itself  on our senses and produces ideas in our mind -- the ideas 
themselves are not part of  the material world, and yet, precisely because of  human freedom, 
are capable of  causing our actions, which have in turn a physical impact on the natural world 
outside us. 
The main vehicle of  this transformation of  the natural world through the operation 
of  human freedom, according to Locke, is labor, the uniquely human ability that allows us 
to “mix” our own freedom with the external order of  things and transform the alien and 
indifferent natural world around us into a reflection of  our own needs and designs. Rocks 
that used to resist us become our shelter, animals that threatened us become our food and 
our helpers, and all the other elements of  the outside world are gradually transformed in 
our own image and made to serve our own needs and purposes – indeed, labor humanizes 
the natural world around us and makes it truly ours. It is this process of  the transformation 
of  nature into a reflection of  our own being that Locke has primarily in mind when he says 
that through “mixing” our labor with things we appropriate them, i.e., make them our own, 
not just in a legal sense, which is purely derivative, but above all in the fundamental sense of  
overcoming their independence and transforming them into a humanized environment of  
our own existence. 
There is another consequence of  labor and appropriation that transforms in 
turn the meaning of  human freedom. We have seen that freedom, for Locke, is initially a 
power of  our minds to initiate physical motion (action) that introduces an element of  true 
contingency into the natural world.  But to begin with, our thought processes are themselves 
causally related to the outside world which “impresses” itself  upon our sense organs and 
mechanistically initiates our mental states. In this sense, the initial condition of  human 
existence – the fact that our minds are tabulae rasae which become “filled” with content by 
external impressions – is one of  basic heteronomy: what we are, including what we think and 
desire, may be a mechanical product of  the outside world. But once the process of  labor and 
appropriation comes in and transforms the external world according to our own design, a 
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sort of  evolutionary development takes place: the external world, in which we live and which 
causally shapes our inner lives, ceases to be the indifferent world of  nature and becomes 
itself  human, i.e., an objective extension of  our own mental constructs, so the heteronomy of  
human life is replaced by true autonomy: an extended process of  interaction with the external 
world through which we ourselves ultimately shape our own lives. In other words, what is 
ultimately “mixed” with the external world in the process of  labor is the very personhood and 
humanity of  the laborer.
It is this aspect of  Locke’s theory that provides the most important moral basis of  
the nascent modern liberal outlook in which economic activity is no longer seen as geared 
toward “mere satisfaction” of  heteronomously generated needs imposed on us by our 
physical existence, or as just a precondition of  human freedom. On the contrary, economic 
activity is now seen as the most basic process though which human beings transform the 
world around them in their own image and initiate a complex interaction between themselves 
and the natural world that amounts to an activity of  human “self-creation”: what labor 
produces is not just goods or commodities, but the very autonomous human beings who 
now live the lives they themselves design and determine. Thus, labor, which is at the basis of  
economic life, far from enslaving those who engage in it, is the prime expression of  human 
creativity, a true production of  new reality governed by human intellect and imagination, in 
which we can recognize and shape ourselves in accordance with our own will.
Perhaps even more revolutionary is the fact that Locke views this production 
of  the human environment not as an essentially communal venture, but as something 
inherently stamped with human individuality. Although the effects of  human labor are of  
course cumulative, each contribution is uniquely individual, and its immediate result is the 
establishment of  a specific link between the particular product of  labor and its individual 
author, whose activity takes the object out of  the world of  nature and transforms it into a 
piece of  property that is inherently private. Locke is a committed nominalist, and all social 
entities are for him no more than collections of  individuals. Economic activity, endowed as 
it is with the moral significance of  man’s self-production, is also an aggregate of  potentially 
self-standing individual contributions.
What Locke lacked, of  course, was a clear theory of  how individual acts of  
appropriation relate to each other, how they “aggregate” with each other, and how they 
fit into a coherent whole. To be sure, Locke’s political theory rests on the assumption that 
in entering into a social contract, each individual is primarily looking for the protection 
of  his property – which of  course amounts not just to the safeguarding of  one’s physical 
and material security, but to a defense of  one’s very personhood embodied in the products 
of  labor – and in doing so, each person renounces the natural right of  self-defense and 
subscribes to the establishment of  an impartial authority that protects the peace. But the 
political contract is only an external safeguard of  a pre-existing system of  property rights, 
which the state only ratifies, and which dates back to the state of  nature. As such, the 
political state is merely an ex post enforcer of  the basic ethical principles underlying the 
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productive order established by the process of  individual appropriation. Unlike Hobbes, 
who had thought that the state of  nature was characterized by universal conflict, Locke 
believed that even the pre-political state already contained universally recognizable rules of  
just human interaction, and that the conflicts generated in the state of  nature were only due 
to a lack of  impartial enforcement, not to the absence of  viable rules themselves. 
Nevertheless, even if  the state of  nature is not a war of  all against all, Locke does 
not provide a satisfactory account of  how the individual actions of  many self-standing and 
independent individuals cohere into a social whole. Avoiding outright war and disorder does 
not by itself  assure a true harmony among individual actors, either in the sense of  fostering 
some sort of  genuine cooperation or in the sense of  achieving a beneficial aggregation 
in which the whole product of  an economic system is greater than just the sum of  
individual actions by isolated individuals. Indeed, when many individuals pursue their own 
uncoordinated interests in a world of  limited resources, there is a serious chance that, even if  
they don’t come to blows, their competition may produce an aggregate outcome inferior to 
that produced by some form of  cooperation. In other words, an economy is more than just 
a collection of  Robinson Crusoes, and even more importantly, when many Crusoes operate 
on the same island, there is always a question how their interests will be aggregated into a 
whole that is beneficial to all.
In other words, while Locke has a political theory of  how conflicting individual interests 
should be adjudicated and kept within the limits of  peaceful interaction, he does not have 
an economic theory capable of  showing that self-interested actions of  individual producers 
aggregate into an outcome that is socially optimal. Or, looking at it from a different angle, 
while he has an ethical and philosophical theory of  labor that makes it into a cornerstone of  
human freedom, he does not have a social theory of  production that explains whether the 
freedom of  one human being is not only compatible, but in fact also complementary, with 
that of  another.
That kind of  theory, crowning the intellectual construction of  the liberal outlook, was, 
of  course, provided by Adam Smith’s conception of  the invisible hand. Most economists see 
in that insight a discovery of  the unique and quite marvelous mechanism of  coordination 
by which the market spontaneously brings together innumerable independent actions of  
many individuals. But of  equal importance in our context of  an inquiry into the ethical 
significance of  economic activity is the moral aspect of  the invisible-hand conception – the aspect 
that was very much in the mind of  Smith himself, a moral philosopher, after all, who saw 
the invisible coordination of  individual self-interested actions as taking the moral odium off  
the pursuit of  self-interest and transforming it into genuine virtue, much as the pursuit of  
self-preservation was seen in the 18th century not as a selfish, immoral drive, but as a natural 
right (not just in the sense of  something we are allowed to do, but also in the sense of  what 
is right for us to do) of  man whose duty is to protect and develop the natural endowments 
of  God’s creation. Indeed, according to Smith, pursuing his own self-interest is the most 
effective course of  action through which a butcher can serve others – preferable to devoting 
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himself  explicitly to an altruistic goal of  working for the benefit of  other people.5
At its origins, then, the modern liberal worldview is not primarily a political theory, 
but a moral theory of  economic production. It is a theory that views labor as a paradigmatic 
expression of  human freedom and the way in which we interact with the world around us 
and form ourselves as autonomous self-creations. Economic development, to the extent 
it can be articulated as a historical progression of  our interaction with nature and of  our 
own autonomy, is largely co-extensive with the history of  human culture, knowledge, and 
civilization. Art, literature, and music, because of  the particularly sophisticated nature of  
their products, may be more clearly recognizable as the primary artifacts of  human culture, 
but their place in human life is not in principle different from the other objects we produce 
both to consume and to define the fundamental conditions of  our own existence. To be 
sure, economic life can run into its own excesses and generate all kinds of  pragmatic and 
moral problems. Excessive inequality is always a possible outcome of  economic activity, 
and the thoroughgoing transformation of  the natural world can wander into ecological and 
environmental dead-ends. Some collective regulation of  economic life is therefore always 
necessary to set its clear rules, prevent unintended distortions, assure some basic dignity 
for all the participants, etc. But, unlike for Aristotle, politics and other non-economic 
forms of  self-governance are not, for liberals, the primary locus of  human self-realization. 
A deeper (and probably unintended) meaning of  President Clinton’s quip that economic 
issues ultimately decide political discussions (“It’s the economy, stupid!”) is not that the low-
brow materialistic economic concerns can interfere with the higher values pursued by the 
politicians. On the contrary, it is that the proper discourse of  politics is mostly derivative 
with respect to economic life because the latter is the primary creative activity of  the modern 
man. Political regulation of  economic life is thus not an imposition of  some external higher 
norms curtailing the amoral, self-interested pursuits of  economic actors, but a process 
of  collective reflection that aims at eliminating contingent distortions of  the ethics of  
production and at bringing out its inherent and defining “spiritual” values.
The liberal worldview is seen in many ways as the dominant conception of  the 
modern man and modern political constitution. But, as I argued here, the victory of  liberalism, 
although very convincing on the surface, has always been very fragile in the intellectual, 
cultural, and even political domains. The “tyranny of  Greece”6 over the education of  the 
Europeans gave Aristotle a permanent hold over the minds of  many. The deep entrenchment 
of  the Christian worldview, which sees the natural world as divinely preordained to serve us, 
never allowed many others to perceive the essence of  human existence in our interaction 
with nature and its transformation according to our own, rather than divine, design. The 
persistence of  the aristocratic ideals has made the “bourgeois” fixation on productive life 
seem vulgar and ethically suspect. And the rise of  class politics in the 19th century produced 
a somewhat curious, but very broad and lasting, alliance of  the working classes with the 
5  See Adam Smith (1863, reprinted 1981), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of  the Wealth of  Nations (Vol. I), pp. 26.
6  I am borrowing here from the title of  E. M. Butler’s book The Tyranny of  Greece over Germany: A Study of  the Influence Exercised by Greek 
Art and Poetry over the Great German Writers of  the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge University Press, 1935).
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old-fashioned ideology of  the pre-capitalist order. Whether inspired by Marx or Disraeli, 
Bismarck or the Webbs, the 19th century social critics and their 20th century heirs have all 
spoken with essentially the same voice. The problem with modern society, they thought, is 
its materialism, sanctification of  greed and selfishness, and capitalist moral impoverishment. 
The greatest achievement of  modernity – its unprecedented productive growth, with all its 
material wealth and the individual freedom it enabled – has been, in the consciousness of  
too many, relegated to the domain of  the morally empty and the spiritually impoverished. 
The greatest “culture war” in history is still going on.
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